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RESPONDENT'S AND CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
srrATEMEN'T OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages suffered by vendees 
who purchased property under a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract from vendors then in default on their mortgage, 
'vho concealed such def a ult from the vendees, and who 
suffered the mortgagee to foreclose the vendors' mort-
gage. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOW'ER COURT 
American Savings & Loan Association, the mort-
gagor, was granted sununary judgment foreclosing 
appellants' mortgage. The court concluded that appel-
lants (Blomquist) were in default, and that respondents 
(Sellars) were in default for failure to make certain 
payments on the Uniform Estate Contract. For that 
reason, the court concluded that neither party had a 
cause of action against the other and dismissed their 
respective claims. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents (Sellars) seek reversal of the judgment 
of dismissal of their claim against appellants (Blom-
quist). 
Appellants (Blomquist) and respondents (Sellars) 
contracted for the sale and purchase of certain real 
property pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
(R. 26, 27; F.F. 2, R. 168) At the time of the contract 
appellants (Blomquist) were in default to American 
Savings & Loan Association on their mortgage, as de-
termined by adjudication and judgment in favor of 
American Savings & Loan Association. (R. 81, No. 21; 
R. 90, No. 21; R. 2, No. 3; F.F. 3, R. 168). 
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Respondents (Sellars) had made regular monthly 
payments in accordance with the terms of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract until they were served with a 
Hummons and Complaint in the foreclosure action 
brought by American 8avings & Loan Association, at 
which time they discontinued regular payments and com-
menced payments only upon appointment of a receiver, 
thereafter, making regular payments directly to the re-
ceiver. (F.F. No. ±, R. 168; R. 187) Respondents (Sel-
lars) were served with American Savings & Loan Asso-
eiation's Summons and Complaint on February 16, 1967 
whereby they first learned of appellants' (Blomquist) 
<lefault on th(' \\'ith American Savings & Loan 
Association and concomitant breach of the terms of 
Paragraph No. 11 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(R. 6±; R. 2, .N"o. 3, and R. 3, No. 4: R. 26, No. 11) On 
}farch S, 1967, respondents (Sellars) filed a third party 
eomplaint against appellants (Blomquist) for default on 
tlw eniform RPal Estate Contract resulting from appel-
lants (Blomquist) failure to mab• their payments on the 
mortgage. Respondents' (Rellars) third party complaint 
was subse<pwntly dismissed without prrjudice. (R. 28-30; 
H. 56) On :\fay .+, 1967 respond<mts (Sellars) filed a 
<·ross eomplaint against appellants (Blomquist) for 
breach of the rniform Real Estate Contract (R. GO, 61). 
App<>llants (Blomquist) subsPquPntly, on 22, 1967, 
anS\\'<'r<>d respon<1Pnts' (Sellars) cross complaint, and 
e ross counkr-ela inwcl to for<>e1ose the Uniform Real 
EstatP Contraet as a (R. 7 4-77) 
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On May 9, 19G7, American Savings & Loan Associa-
tion moved for appojntment of a receiver for rents on 
the property, which motion was apparently not pursued. 
A receiver was appointed November 14, 1967, pursuant 
to a subsequent motion by appellants (Blomquist) for 
appointment of a receiver which was filed on October 
26, 1967, and American Savings & Loan Association's 
joinder in appellants' (Blomquist) motion for appoint-
ment of a receiver dated October 27, 1967. (R,. 71-73; 
R. 9-±, 95; R. 92, 93; R. 9(), 97) Respondents (Sellars) 
then conunenced making monthly payments to the re-
ceiver (F.F. No. 4, R. 168) On October 30, 1968, the 
court granted the motion of American Savings & Loan 
Association for summary judgment and decree of fore-
closure, foreclosing appellants' (Blomquist) rights in 
the property and decreeing respondents' (Sellars) claim 
to be subject to, subordinate and inferior to American 
Savings & Loan Association's mortgage lien. (R. 140, 
No. 4; R. 141; F.F. No. 1, R. 168) On May 1. 1968, the 
statutory period during which appellants (Blomquist) 
might have redeemed the property expired. 
On January 3, 1969, respondents' (Sellars) claim 
against appellants (Blomquist) came on for trial before 
the honorable Marcellus K. Snow. (R. 167) The parties 
were prepared to testify with respect to the various 
issues in the case, but upon consultation between the 
court and counsel, certain facts were stipulated to by the 
parties and subsequently adopted by the court as its 
findings of fact: 
5 
"l. That a judgment was entered on October 
30, 1968, in favor of the plajntiff, American Sav-
ings and Loan Association, and against all de-
fendants, declaring the plaintiff's trust deed to 
be a first trust deed and declaring all defendants' 
interests to he inferior in interest thereto; and 
further, foreclosing the said trust deed and note 
supporting said trust deed as against vVayne T. 
Blomquist, Ruth E. Blomquist, and other defend-
ants; and for an order allowing the plaintiff a 
deficiency judginPnt on the notes against the de-
fendants, vVayne T. Blomquist and Ruth E. Blom-
quist; and that no appeal has been filed from 
said judgment. 
2. That on the Gth day of December, 1965, 
Wayne T. Blomquist and Ruth E. Blomquist en-· 
tered jnto a Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
A. D. Sellars and l\Iarie L. Sellars, the form of 
which contract was agreed to by the parties and 
their counsel at the time of trial, a copy of which 
was prt-scnted at that time and agreed to by 
counsel as bejng a copy of thP contract ht-tween 
the parbes. 
3. That at the timP the parties entered into 
the Fniform Real Estate Contract, the Blom-
quists were in thP fact position which was the 
hasis of the plaintiff's, American Savings & Loan 
Association, cause of action and were the facts 
which supported the theory upon which the judg-
nwnt of Octolwr 30th, 1968, rested. 
4-. rr1w S(>llars COlllllH'nced makjng monthly 
pay:nwnts and had made regular monthly pa?'-
ments nnti1 Hwy wert> sprved wHh a summons rn 
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the above entitled action, at which time they dis-
continued regular payments and commenced pay-
ments only upon the appointment of a receiver, 
and paid the amount presently in the possession 
of the said receiver. 
5. There is presently on hand in the posses-
sion of the reeciver, the amount of 
6. A judgment of foreclosure was entered 
on the 30th day of October, 1968, and a foreclosure 
sale was set for January 7th, 1969, at the hour of 
12 :00 noon." (R. 168) 
The court concluded from the facts stipulated to, that the 
appellants (Blomquist) were in default to American Sav-
ings & Loan Association at the time they entered into 
the contract with the respondents (Sellars), and "were 
subsequently foreclosed and precluded from any further 
inteerst therein for the reason that the provisions in the 
contract were dependent and could not be enforced while 
in default and that the said appellants (Blomquists) 
were not entitled to foreclose the title to property they 
had been previously foreclosed out of themselves." (C.L. 
No. 4, R. 169) 
The court rendered judgment the 5th day of March, 
1969, dismissing appellants' claim against respondents 
for failure to state a cause of action and dismissing re-
spondents' claim against appellants for failure to state 




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT APPELLANTS COULD NOT FORECLOSE 
RESPONDENTS' TITLE TO THE PROPERTY FOR 
THE REASON THAT APPELLANTS WERE IN DE-
FAULT OF THE CONTRACT AT THE TIME THEY 
ENTERED INTO IT. 
Appellants were ·wilfully in default on the Uniform 
Heal Estate 'Contract at the very instant they set their 
pens to the paper. Paragraph No. 11 of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract prepared by appellants own hand 
]Jrovidt's that: 
"The seller hereby covenants and agrees that 
there are no assessments against said premises 
except the fallowing: "None" (typed into the 
printed form) 
The seller further covenants and agrees that 
he will not default in the payment of his obliga-
tion against the said property." (R. 26) 
By their own admission respondents knew that they had 
been in default of their mortgage with American Sav-
ings & Loan Association, since at least October 15, 1964. 
(R. 81, No. 21; R. 90, No. 21) This court has followed 
the rule that a vendee can not attack a vendor's title 
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in advance of tender of the final payment. Woodward v. 
Allen, 1 U.2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (1953); Leavitt v. Blohrn, 
11 U.2d 220, 357 P .2d 190 ( 1960). In W oodioar.d v. Allen, 
supra,, the defendant signed an agreement with the plain-
tiff for the purchase of real property on one evening, 
delivering a $500.00 check as down payment, then stopped 
payment on foe check the next morning. Defendant 
attempted to justify this action on the basis of certain 
quiet title suits prosecuted by the county to resolve all 
doubt as to the validity of certain tax deeds, which were 
links in the chain of title to the property. 
The court noted that it believed that "defendants' 
objections were received after the stop payment and 
were designed to avoid a bargain regretted,'' and that 
under the facts of the case, "plaintiffs were not obliged 
to prove marketable title simply because defendant 
raised the point." The facts of this case clearly support 
the court in its conclusion that, "defendants' attack on 
the marketability of plaintiffs' title was premature." 
Its judgment in favor of plaintiff, compelling specific 
performance on the contract, is a remedy such as could 
not be rendered in this case, since plaintiff has no title 
to convey in any event. The court in Leavitt v. Blohrn, 
supra, agreed that "the purchaser can not use a claimed 
deficiency in title as an excuse for refusing to keep a 
commitment to purchase property, as was attempted in 
the case of Woodward v. Allen" (emphasis supplied by 
the court. The court distinguished the case before them 
from the Woodward case. "vV e see no impropriety in 
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the trial eourt's view that where the [plaintiffs] had 
permitted their interest in the property to become in-
volved in such a way that the buyer did not have the 
quiet and peaceable enjoyment of it, coupled with the 
further fact that the circumstances justified forebodings 
that they would not be able to extricate themselves from 
their difficulty and be in a position to convey title, [de-
fendant] was not obliged to continue payments, but 
c-ould take such measures as seemed necessary and pru-
dent to protect herself." The facts of the Leavitt case, 
which the court here n•garded as distinguishable from 
1Voodward, ·were briefly, that defendant contracted to 
purchase proprrty from plaintiff, which plaintiff had 
acquired as the last of a series of transactons involving 
the property, and the contract for which they were in 
d( .. fault. That is, a situation substantially identical to 
that in the instant case. The court said that: 
''The effect of [the trial court's determina-
tion] was to recognize [defendant's] right to re-
gard thr contract as breached by the [plaintiff] 
and to justify her rrfnsal to perform." 
The court might well find in this case that the hiatus 
in rrspondents' payments was not "designed to avoid 
a harg-ain regretted,'' nor even an absolute refusal to 
perform, such as was found by the court to be justified 
in Leavitt r. Rlolun. hut rather a mere attempt to avoid 
making pay:men ts to who possibly had no rights 
'rith res1wct to the payments. 
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The California Court of Appeals in Lloyd v. Locke-
Paddon Land Co., (5 Cal. App. 2d 211, 42 P.2d 367) 
(1953), examined the question, whether a seller who 
permitted a foreclosure sale thereby committed such a 
hreach as to relieve the buyer of his obligation to con-
tinue payments on the contract. The court said that the 
purchasers' failure to continue payments "was a breach 
of the contract ... unless the mere permitting of the 
foreclosure sale constituted a prior breach on the part 
of appellants relieving respondent from his obligation 
to continue such payments." The Court added, 
"In the present case it was not alleged, nor 
did it appear that the seller had done or suffered 
any act prior to the def a ult of the purchaser 
which rendered the seller incapable of performing 
the contrart." And 
"We do not wish to be understood as holding 
that a purchaser must, in all cases, continue to 
make his payments throughout the period of re-
demption where the seller has permitted the prop-
erty to be sold under foreclosure. Such a rule 
would no doubt work a hardship in cases where 
the seller, due to insolvency or other cause, is 
wholly incapable of performing on a contract even 
upon a tender by the purchaser." 
Appellants' reliance on this case is misplaced for the 
reason that the plaintiff-purchaser in the cit<:•d case was 
attempting to recover payments made to a conditional 
vendor, ·whereas in the instant case the appellant-vendor 
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is attempting to forcelose. In Lloyd, supra, the vendee 
Pntered into a contract with the vendor at a time when the 
vendor was not in def a ult. When the vendor defaulted 
such that a foreclosure action was initiated against him, 
the vendee stopped making payments, and never did 
re-commence making payments. The effect of the ven-
dee's failure or refusal to continue making payments 
after the default was a disavowal or abrogation of the 
contract. Having put himself in the best possible pos-
ture, free from further liability, free from further ex-
pense, he then attempted to recoup sums paid under a 
valid, good-faith contract. 
Respondents (Sellars) have shown no such duplicity. 
Having contracted, bonafide on their part for the pur-
chase of a home, they became understandably apprehen-
sive about their home and investment when they were 
served with documents aimed at foreclosing their ven-
dor's right and interest in the property. Respondents 
stopped making payments to Appellants (Blomquist). 
But, and this is the telling factor, they resumed pay-
ments to a receiver well witl1in the period within which 
appellants (Blomquist) might have redeemed. Respond-
ents (Sellars) did not seek to avoid the contract; they 
did not cast off their obligations; they did not act in 
had faith at any time herein. 
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POINT 2 
APPELLANTS' FAIL URE TO DISCLOSE TO RE-
SPONDENTS THEIR THEN EXISTING DEFAULT 
ON THE MORTGAGE GIVEN TO AMERICAN SA V-
INGS & LO AN ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTED 
FRAUD AND WILFUL DEFAULT JUSTIFYING THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DISMISSING APPEL-
LANTS' CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
Elder v. Clausen, 14 U.2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963), 
was an action to rescind a contract for the sale of farm 
land which was under quarantine the vendor had failed 
to give the vendee. The court concluded "that here 
there was a suppression of the truth, which the party 
with superior knowledge had a duty to disclose, which 
amounted to fraud. 
'One of the fundamental tenants of the Anglo-Ameri-
can Law of Fraud is that fraud mav be committed hy 
the suppression of the truth . . . as well as the sug-
gestion of falsehood .... ' 
Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated 
transaction is acting under a mistaken belief as to cer-
tain facts is a factor determining that a duty of dis-
closure is owing. There is much authority to tlw effect 
that if one party to a contract or transaction has superior 
knowledge or knowledge that is not within the fair and 
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reasonable reach of the other party, and which he could 
not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or 
means of knowledge which are not open to both the par-
ties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak, and his 
silence constitutes fraud, especially when the other party 
relies upon him to communicate to him the true state of 
facts to enable him to judge of the expediency of the 
Largain." This case, of course, deals with the quality 
of the property in qurstion; the relief sought was re-
scission. In the Eldr:r case, the vendees had had no 
experience in farming or ranching: they relied on the 
representations of the vendor, who did have such exper-
jence, that the noxious weeds could be easily destroyed 
and presented no problem. In this case Respondents 
(Sellars), a mechanic and house\vif e, relied on the repre-
sentations of appPllant (Blomquist), an experienced in-
V('Stment and real estate broker, that Respondents (Sel-
lars) did not need the advice of an attornPy as they had 
proposed, since he (Blomquist) was fully qualified and 
0xperienced in such matters, to disclose to respondents 
thefact that respondents nught, as a result of the fore-
<'losure artion, have no tjtle to convey to respondents 
regardless of whether or not resopnd0nts had tendered 
the full purchase price. In addition, appellants executed 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract a provision where-
by appellants covenanted and agreed that there were 
no assesf'ments against tlie prop0rty, and that they would 
not default in the paymPnt of their obligations against 
tLe propPrty. Appellants lrne\Y at that time, and were 
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obligated to so inform the respondents, that they were 
in default on their mortgage, and in danger of fore-
closure. 
POINT 3 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING RE-
SPONDENTS' CLAIM AS FAILING TO STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE THE RESPONDENTS 
HAD SUSPENDED PAYMENTS FOLLOWING DIS-
COVERY OF APPELLANTS DEFAULT AND RE-
SUMED PAYMENTS TO A COURT APPOINTED 
RECEIVER. 
This court, in Leavitt v. Blohrn, supra, strongly sup-
ported the right of a vendee to at least temporarily 
discontinue making payments where the actions of the 
vendor had jeopardized the vendee's equity. The court 
said: 
"It is to be kept in mind that the obligations 
of such contracts run both ways. It is true that 
if the buyer fails to make his payments he can not 
enforce his rights. By the same token, if the 
seller fails to meet his commitments, he likewise 
can not expect the buyer to perform. An im-
portant attribute of the mvnership of real prop-
erly, ... [is] the right of the quiet and peaceable 
enjoyment of it. She (the vendee) had a right 
to look to [the vendors] not to leave her vulner-
able to being disturl>ed therein. Her responsibil-
15 
ity to make payments to them was dependent 
upon their fulfillment of this duty to her. . . . 
The [vendee] knew that unless the [vendors] 
made the payments she was exposed to the risk 
of a judgment in the suit by the vendors' mort-
gage." 
Respondents ceased making payments to appellants 
only when it was apparent that their title was in extreme 
danger owing to appellants' default on the mortgage; 
they resumed making payments when the court appointed 
a receiver; respondents' suit was grounded on the fear 
that their efforts and expenditures would be irrevocably 
lost to an insolvent seller who would be ultimately unable 
to convey any title at all. Respondents have not even 
sought recision to avoid the contract; their good faith is 
further shown by their resumtpion of payments to a 
court-appointed receiver upon whose integrity, regard-
ing distribution of the moneys paid him, they knew they 
rould rely. 
coNcLrsrox 
Respondents respectfully submit that the trial court 
rorrectly dismissed appellants' claim for failure to state 
a claim upon ''Thich reliPf could he granted, in light of 
the fact that appellants entered into the contract of sale 
with full knowledge that their own mortgage on the same 
property was in default, and of the fact that the subse-
(jlWnt for0closure of that mortgage deprived them of 
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any title or right which they might convey; that the 
trial court erred in dismissing respondents' claim for 
failure to state a claim upon \vhich relief might be 
granted, in light of the fact that the Uniform Real Es-
tate Contract executed by and between respondents and 
appellants had been breached hy appellants even at the 
moment of execution thereof, and at least, prior to the 
time respondents discontinued making payments directly 
to appellants. Respondents are entitled to a judgment 
reversing the dismissal of respondents' claim and for a 
trial to determine the question of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS 
SUMMERHAYS, KLINGLE & 
CORNE 
1010 University Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for the Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant 
